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LEGISLATION*
Motor Carrier Regulation Under Pennsylvania's 1937 Public
Utility Law
The mushroom like growth of the trucking industry has led to numerous
legislative efforts to control this new medium of transportation.' At the last
session of the legislature Pennsylvania joined the ranks of those states supervising the industry by enacting, as a part of its new public utility law,2 a comprehensive regulatory program 3 patterned after recent federal legislation. 4 Indicative of the rise of this transportation group is the fact that twenty years ago
the railroads let pass unnoticed its efforts to establish itself. Today they are
frankly fearful of their lusty young rival.5 So phenomenal was its growth that
the lawmakers had a problem on their hands before they were aware of it. Complicating the situation was the fact that this new development did not follow
traditional carrier lines. Although a considerable portion of the industry fell
into the common carrier class, a great part of it was a new type, the contract
carrier. With the common carrier by motor vehicle the legislatures had little
difficulty; they had had sufficient practice in regulating the railroads 6 to accomplish the change from rails to roads with comparative ease.
The contract carrier, however, presented a different problem. This group
did not hold itself out to serve the public as did the common carriers, but rather
served relatively few customers under individual contracts. 7 The traditional incidents raising the right to control in the case of the common carrier were not
characteristic of the contract carrier. Thus, it is not surprising that the states
experienced difficulty in their efforts to control the latter. Accordingly, the
future course of Pennsylvania's regulation of contract carriers may well be forecast by an examination of the judicial treatment accorded similar legislative
attempts in other states.
Constitutionality of Regulation
In any question involving this type of regulation there are two problems:
first, the right to regulate at all," and second, the mode of effectuating such regu* The Legislation on the Pennsylvania Mortgage Deficiency Act, published in 86 U. OF

PA. L. REv.

295 (1938), was written by Howard A. Reid.
I. See for example the following statutes: ALA. CODE (Michie, Supp. 1936) § 6270 (1) 6270 (115); ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, Supp. 1936)§ 168o; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford &
Moses, Supp. 1931) § 744oa; CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) § 5933a; GA.
CODE (1933) §§ 68-501-526, 68-601-634; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936) 2739j-I; MINN. STAT.
ANN. (Mason, Supp. 1936) § 5015-1; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §§ 5471, 5533 et seq.;
TEx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1934) art. giIb; WASH. Rvv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932)

§ 6382;
2.

WIS. STAT. (93)

Pa. Laws 1937,

no.

§ 194.01.

286.

3. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII. This article deals only with contract carriers and
affiliates. Common carriers by motor vehicle are regulated elsewhere in the new Act. The
common carrier group was controlled under prior utility legislation EPA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) § I et seq.], the new Act being in this respect basically a reenactment of the old.
For a comprehensive discussion of the other portions of the Act, see Ballard, Recent Public
Utility Legislation, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 18, 1937, P. I, col. 2.
4. Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543 (935), 49 U. S. C. A. §3Ol (Supp. 1937).
5. See Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 285 (1932).
6. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 (1876) ; Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319
(1877) ; MOSHER & CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1033) 14 et seq.
7. However, the number of contracts is not controlling. Denver & R. G. Ry. v. Linck, 56 F.
(2d) 957 (C. C. A. ioth, 1932) ; Haynes v. MacFarlane, 207 Cal. 529, 279 Pac. 436 (1929).
Brown and Scott, Regulation of the Contract Motor Carrier Under the Constitution (1931)
44 HARv. L. REV. 530, 536.
8. 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 1223; WILLIS, CONSTTUTIONAL LAw (936) 721; Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court
(403)
(1927) 4o HARv. L. RaV. 943.
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lation once the initial right to regulate has been established.9 In both problems
the question of constitutional limitations is important. 10 However, it is the first
of these problems only, the initial right to regulate, which is involved in the immediate discussion." At the outset it must be noted that the state's initial right
to regulate emanates from one source, the residuary police power,' 2 while the
authority of the federal government is derived from another source, an express
or implied constitutional grant. 3 Furthermore, it must be observed that in the
case of state regulation the Fourteenth Amendment not only circumscribes the
police power from which the initial regulatory authority is derived,' 4 but likewise the mode of effectuating such regulation.' 5 In the case of federal control
the Constitution generates the initial regulatory authority, 0 and the Fifth
Amendment delimits the mode of effectuating it." Failure to observe these distinctions may result in a confused analysis of the constitutional problems involved in this type of regulation.'
In an effort to establish their right to regulate contract carriers, some states,
mindful of their recognized authority over common carriers, simply legislated
contract carriers into the common carrier category.' 9 However, when such a
statute was brought before the Supreme Court in the Duke case,'20 it ran afoul
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court making this pronouncement:
"Moreover, it is beyond the power of the state by legislative fiat to
convert property used exclusively in the business of a private carrier into
a public utility for that would be taking property for public use without
just compensation which no state can do consistently with the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 21
Thus, this attempt of some states at regulating contract carriers on the basis of
the familiar right to control common carriers failed.
California passed a statute which, while not expressly stating that contract
carriers might not retain their private status, nevertheless imposed upon both
common and contract carriers identical regulations.2" The statute was held invalid 4by the Supreme Court in the Frost case,' 3 upon the authority of the Duke
case.2

The proponents of the statute in the Frost case, however, advanced a new
theory to sustain the act, namely, that the state could legitimately condition its
9. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 3O U. S. 292 (1937); Edison Light &
Power Co. v. Driscoll, 5 U. S. L. WEK 16o (M. D. Pa. 1937), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 314;
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 128 Pa. Super. 195, 193 Atl. 427
(1937) ; Willis, loc. cit. supra note 8; Denny, The Growth and Development of the Police
Power of the State (1921) 2o MIcH. L. REv. 173.
IO. See supra notes 8 and 9.
ii. See infra p. 408, for discussion of the constitutionality of devices used to effectuate
regulation.
12. WILLIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 727; Brown, supra note 8, at 952 et seq.; Denny,
supra note 9.
13. WILLIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 721.
14. See supra notes 8 and 9.
15. See supra note 9.
16. WILLIS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 721.
17. Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1893) ; Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935), 35 COL. L. REv. 932; see In re American States
Public Service Co., 12 F. Supp. 667, 706 (D. Md. 1935).
I8. See Legis. (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 945, 966.
1g. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §6270 (I); Kans. Laws 1929, c. 222; Mich. Acts 1923,
no. 2og, §§ 1-3; Mo. Laws 1927, p. 402; VA. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1936) §4097m.
2o. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570 (925), 38 HARv. L. Rav. 98o.
21. Id. at 577.
o2. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1923) no. 5129.
23. Frost v. Railroad Comm., 271 U. S. 583 (1926), ao HARv. L. Rav. 131.
24. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570 (1925).
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grant of the privilege to use the highways as a place of business. 5 This theory
was based in part on the right of the state in the exercise of its broad police
power to place limitations on the use of the highways in the interest of their
conservation and public safety. 26 The theory was also based upon the fact that
the state can completely exclude carriers for hire from its highways 27 inasmuch
as they use them for profit not as a matter of right but by way of privilege.2
Accordingly, it was thought that if the state had this power of exclusion, it could
condition its grant of privilege as it saw fit, whether by regulation of business
or otherwise. Even though the Supreme Court of California upheld the provision requiring a contract carrier to secure a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, 29 it felt called upon to construe the whole act and in doing so
asserted that the result of it was to convert contract carriers into common carriers. 30 The United States Supreme Court declared that, accepting this concondition, 31 and hence, could not
struction of the act, it was an unconstitutional
2
be affixed to the grant of the privilege.3
The legislature of one state has been successful in sustaining its regulatory
program. Texas in 1931 passed an act regulating the business of contract carriers by requiring permits and fixing minimum rates.3 3 The system of regulation of contract carriers was set up entirely apart from the regulatory measures
prescribed for common carriers, although many of them were practically identical.3 4 The entire act was prefaced by a broad declaration of policy wherein the
Texas legislature stated that the "hazards on public highways . . . make it

imperative that more stringent regulations should be employed, to the end that
the highways may be rendered safer for the use of the general public; that the
31
wear on such highways may be reduced ....
The act was attacked in the Stephenson case 36 by certain contract carriers who denied the constitutional right of the state to regulate their business.
The lower federal court sustained the act, frankly recognizing that it regulated
business.2 7 The Supreme Court, however, while affirming the decision of the
25.

Frost v. Railroad Comm.,

271

U. S. 583, 587 (1926).

26. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924) ; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925);
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352 (1932) ; Rosenbaum & Lilienthal, Motor
CarrierRegulation: Federal,State, and Municipal (1926) 26 Coi. L. REv. 954; Note (1932)
1i N. C. L. REv. 355, 357.
27. "That the state may altogether exclude hauling by carrier, common or contract intrastate, from its roads, is generally taken for granted." Stephenson v. Binford, 53 F. (2d) 509,
514 (S. D. Tex. I93I).
28. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924) ; Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 147 N. E.
797 (i925) ; Railroad Comm. v. McDonald, 9o S. W. (2d) 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; State
ex rel. Sikeston v. Missouri Util. Co., 331 Mo. 337, 53 S. W. (2d) 394 (1932).
29. CAL.GEi. LAws (Deering, 1923) no. 5129.
3o. Frost v. Railroad Comm., 197 Cal. 230, 240 Pac. 26 (1925).
31. Frost v. Railroad Comm., 271 U. S. 583 (1926). ". . . as a general rule, the state,
having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit
to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions" which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. . . . It is inconceivable that guarantees imbedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence." Id. at 593.
32. The extension of this doctrine has been severely criticized. See Merrill, Unconstituional Conditions (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 879; Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J.469, 471.
33. TEx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1934) art. 9IIb.
34. Ibid.

35. Id. § 22b.
36. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S.251 (932),

27 ILL. L. REv. 942, 8 IND. L. J.552
(933) ; Notes (1933) 31 MicH. L. REV. 395, 1I N. C. L. REV. 355.
37. Stephenson v. Binford, 53 F. (2d) 509 (S.D. Tex. 1931).
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lower court, based its decision on another ground.38 Taking as its premise the
right of the state to enact measures in conservation of its highways, the Court
found that the regulatory devices were "means to the legitimate end of conserving the highways". 9 In this way the Court avoided the consequences of
the unconstitutional condition doctrine which it had employed in the Frost
41
case,40 and held the regulation not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In view of the foregoing decisions the present position of the Supreme Court
may be established with reasonable certainty. A state may not by legislative
fiat, either expressly 42 or in effect, 43 convert a contract carrier into a common
carrier with its attendant obligations. However, a state may, in the exercise of
its constitutional control over highways, regulate the business of a contract cartier, if such
44 regulation bears a conceivably reasonable relation to highway conservation.
With the position of the Supreme Court thus outlined, the question of the
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Act, as regards the initial right to regulate
may be considered. Inasmuch as the Act provides for permits rather than certificates of public convenience, 45 distinguishes a contract carrier from a common
carrier, 48 and sets up separate regulatory measures for the former, it should
avoid the stigma of conversion of contract carriers into common carriers by legislative fiat. However, while this much of the constitutional question may be
settled in favor of the Act, the declaration of policy 47 leaves unsettled a considerable part of it.
In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Stephenson case one
would expect the declaration of policy in the Pennsylvania Act to parallel that
of the Texas statute. 48 Instead, it is declared to be the legislative intent to regulate common carriers "to develop and preserve a safe highway transportation
system properly adapted to the needs of the commerce of the Commonwealth .. .." It is further stated that because of the interrelation between
common carriers and contract carriers and brokers, it is necessary to regulate
contract carriers and brokers.49 It seems shortsighted on the part of the drafters
to omit provisions similar to that portion of the Texas statute which was so
38. "In view of the conclusions to which we shall come, it is not necessary to determine
whether the operation of trucks . . . under private contracts . . . is a business impressed with a public interest." Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 269 (1932).
39. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 272 (1932). In establishing its position the
court said: "The extent to which they [regulatory measures] as means, conduce to that end
[highway conservation], the degree of their efficiency, the closeness of their relation to the
end sought to be attained, are matters addressed to the judgment of the legislature, and not
to that of the courts. It is enough if it can be seen that in any degree, or under any reasonably conceived circumstances, there is an actual relation between the means and the end." Id.
at 272.

40. Frost v. Railroad Comm., 271 U. S. 583 (1926).
41. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's pronouncement to the contrary, it has been
sufficiently demonstrated that such measures are not in fact conducive to the conservation of
the highways. See Notes (1933) 31 MicH. L. REV. 395, 405, II N. C. L. REV. 355, 358;
(1933) 8 ILw. L. REv. 552.
42. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 57o (1925).
43. Frost v. Railroad Comm., 271 U. S. 583 (1926). The Florida court in construing the
statute of that state, seeking to avoid the error of the California court, expressly declared that
the Florida statute did not convert contract carriers into common carriers. Cahoon v. Smith, 99
Fla. 1174, 128 So. 632 (1930). The Supreme Court, however, in Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S.
553 (1931), viewed the provisions of the act and stated that their effect was to convert contract carriers into common carriers, which could not be done, as had been previously decided.
44. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 (1932). See supra note 38.
45. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 8o4.
46. Id. art. I, § 2 (7).

47. Id. art. VIII, § 8oi.

48. TEx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1934) art. 9iIb, § 22b. See supra p. 405.
49. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 8oi.
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expressly relied on by the Supreme Court in the Stephenson case, namely, the
declaration concerning the reduction of wear and tear on the highways.5 0 Should
a constitutional test arise, the proponents of the Act will have deprived themselves of their most effective defensive weapon, a case on all fours with Stephenson v. Binford.
However, this omission from the declaration of policy does not necessarily
force the conclusion that the Act will not survive a constitutional attack. Another and perhaps firmer ground of support may be found in the recognized
authority of a state to regulate directly through its police power certain businesses as such.5" In order to demonstrate the applicability of this direct regulatory authority it will be necessary to examine briefly certain antecedents of the
present right to control. At early common law nearly every calling was subject
to the demands of the entire public, the rejected customer having his action for
a refusal to serve him. 52 However, with the increase in business competition
the laissez-faire theory appeared on the economic horizon with the pronouncement that it was not sound economics to regulate business.53 Thus, the regulatory power of the state changed from an ordinary to an extraordinary power
that was to be used sparingly. Upon the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment this power became more and more circumscribed by due process require-

ments.5 4

An approximation of the area of valid state regulation has resulted from
judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it has been a trial
and error method, progress being made by the individual case. 55 For present
purposes, however, it is sufficient to indicate the results of this progress. Until
quite recently it was the accepted dogma that a "business affected with a public
interest" was subject to state regulation, 8 while one not so affected was beyond
the reach of the state's regulatory arm. A steady progression of businesses has
been forced into the former sphere but the characteristics of a "business affected
with a public interest" are still incapable of definition.5 7 However, one of those
characteristics, devotion to a public use, which among others has come to be
accepted as one of the incidents of a business subject to state control, 8 sufficiently shows that a contract carrier does not fit into the category of businesses
traditionally thought to be affected with a public interest. Nevertheless, in 1934
the Supreme Court in the Nebbia case5 " indicated that it no longer proposed
to follow the rigid standards which it had prescribed in prior decisions, stating,
"It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses
affected with a public interest. . . . So far as the requirement of due
50. It should be noted that the Pennsylvania Act in the declaration of policy states that
the Act is designed, inter alia, "to promote safe . . . service" and "to develop . . . a safe
highway transportation system". While this bears a certain similarity to the Texas declaration, it is not quite the same since there the regulation is employed "to the end that the highways may be rendered safer for the use of the general public".
5i. See supranote 12.

52. I WYmAm, PuBLic SmvIcE ComoPAnloNs (1911) §§ 2, 7. For example the surgeon,
the tailor, the smith, the victualer, the baker, and the miller were subject to the demands of
the public. See Ballard, supra note 2, at p. i, col. 2.
53. Id. § 27; Ballard, supra note a, at p. i, col. 2.
54. Wn~us, op. cit. supranote 8, at 728.
55. See Hale, The Constitution md the Price System: Some Reflections on Nebbia v.
New York (1934) 34 Co. L. REv. 40I, ,for an excellent discussion showing the trend of the
cases.
56. MosHER & CRAw0Fo, op. cit. supra note 6, at 4; 1 WymAN, op. cit. supra note 55,
§ ig. The leading case enunciating this dogma is Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
57. MosHER & C.AWFoRo, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5.
58. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. X13 (1876) ; Michigan Pub. Util. Comm. v. Duke, 266
U. S.570 (925); Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (IgY7). See Robinson, Public Utility
Concepit in American Law (928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 277, 293.
59. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S.502 (934).
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process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restrictions, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare. .

.

."

o

Certainly the contract carrier viewed both absolutely and in connection with the
common carrier reasonably requires regulation.8 ' It would seem, then, that disregarding the shibboleth "affected with a public interest", a state may legitimately regulate the contract carrier industry as such without infringing Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. This is not such a radical departure as it might
at first appear. In the last analysis the need for regulation is the reason for it.
Stripped of slogans this is the rationale of utility control. Accordingly, it would
appear that the Nebbia case has simply enunciated fundamentals without resort
to traditional devices.
Additional support for the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Act may
be found in a relatively broad statement made by the Supreme Court in the
Sproles case 62 involving the validity of weight restrictions on trucks. In that
case the Court said:
". .. we perceive no constitutional ground for denying to the State the
right to foster a fair distribution of traffic to the end that all necessary facilities should be maintained and that the public should not be inconvenienced by inordinate uses of its highways for purposes of gain." 83
This statement supports the theory expressed in the declaration of policy of the
Act that correlation of all motor carriers and affiliates is necessary to the maintenance of an adequate transportation system.
Still another theory may be employed to support the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania Act. Since the declaration of policy states as one of the purposes
of the Act the regulation of common carriers, the entire regulation of contract
carriers may be viewed as one of the devices employed to effectuate the regulation of common carriers. Under this theory only the second of the two constitutional problems is important, namely, whether such regulation of contract
carriers is a reasonable regulatory device. Since the operation of one group
of necessity affects that of the other, at least from an economic standpoint, it is
possible that a court will hold the relation is such that regulation of the business of one group may be considered a reasonable mode of effectuating the regulation of the other.
Therefore, in view of this additional ground, and in view of the advanced
position of the Supreme Court in the Nebbia case coupled with its earlier statement in the Sproles case, it would seem that a constitutional basis for the Pennsylvania Act can be worked out without resorting to the highway conservation
theory enunciated in the Stephenson case.
Analysis of Provisions of Act
Inasmuch as the Pennsylvania Act was fashioned after the federal Motor
Carrier Act 64 and because the Texas statute has had the approval of the Supreme Court,6" the present analysis will include references to and comparisons
with the other two statutes. Attention must be directed to the fact that throughout this entire section it is the second of the two constitutional problems which
will be considered, namely, the mode of effectuating regulation once the initial
6o. Id. at 536.

61. See Coordination of Motor Transportation System, 182 I. C. C. 263
62. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 (1932).
63. Id. at 394.
64. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3oi (Supp. 1937).
65. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S.251 (1932).

(1932).
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right to regulate has been established. 66 Following federal as well as Pennsylvania precedent, the legislature adopted a recognized definition of a common
carrier.6 7 A contract carrier is defined, in effect, as a motor carrier which does
not hold itself out to serve the public at large and which operates intrastate for
compensation.6 s Added to the definition is a statement aimed at preventing
leasing subterfuges in an effort to escape the operation of the Act.69 This definition is in substantial accord with the definition in the federal act 70 and in the
Texas statute. 71 The federal statute defines and prescribes regulations for another class, private carriers, the distinguishing feature of this class being the
fact that it does not carry for compensation.7 2 This type is not defined in the
Pennsylvania statute and accordingly, no attempt is made to regulate it.
It is enacted that it shall be the commission's duty, generally, to regulate
contract carriers by prescribing minimum rates, requirements with respect to
uniform systems of accounts, requirements with respect to safety of service
and equipment, and insurance requirements.7 3 There are serious doubts as
to the validity of the requirement of shipper insurance, 74 presumably because it
has no relation to highway safety and hence, is not a proper exercise of the
police power. Accordingly, the commission in prescribing insurance requirements would do well to bear in mind this constitutional objection.
The same section provides that the commission shall be empowered to regulate brokers, 75 by prescribing regulations as to licensing, financial responsibility
and accounts. The provisions of this section are the same as the corresponding
section in the federal act,7 6 and would not appear to be unreasonable or arbitrary, but within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment inasmuch as control of this group seems necessary to effectuate the general regulatory policy.
Section 803 77 which allows the commission to make such classifications of
contract carriers and brokers as it deems "necessary or desirable in the public
interest", and to prescribe regulations for such classifications, while harmless as
it stands, unless cautiously administered by the commission, may give rise to
such discrimination that it will not survive constitutional attacks. However,
since it is accepted that the mere possibility of arbitrary action will not support
a constitutional objection, and that the complaining party must show injury be66. Although it be admitted that the right to regulate exists, nevertheless, the devices
employed to render operative that regulation must be reasonable and not arbitrary. If they
are found to be unreasonable, such regulations then are unconstitutional as taking property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra p.
67. A common carrier is defined as any person or corporation "holding out, offering, or
undertaking, directly or indirectly, service for compensation to the public for the transportation of passengers or property. . . ." Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. I, § 2 (6). Producer's
Trans. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 251 U. S. 228 (i92o); Bay v. Merrill & Ring Lumber Co.,
211 Fed. 717 (914) ; Southern Ry.v. Taylor, i6 F. (2d) 517 (App.D. C. 1926) ; Gordon v.
Hutchinson, I W. & S. 285 (Pa. 1841) ; Lloyd v. Haugh, 223 Pa. 148, 72 At. 516 (19o9);
Philips v. Public Serv. Comm., 127 Pa. Super. 341, IgI Atl. 641 (1937).
68. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. I, § 2 (7).

69. Any person or corporation "who or which provides or furnishes, with or without
drivers, any motor vehicle in such transportation. . . ." Ibid.
70. 49 STAT. 544 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §303 (S) (Supp. 1937).
71. TE:x. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1934) art. giib, § i (h).
72. 49 STAT. 544 (935), 49 U. S.C.A. §303 (07) (Supp. i937).
73. Pa.Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 802 (a). See also Id. art. IX,

§ 915.
74. Shipper insurance has also been held to constitute an unreasonable interference with
the right to contract. Public Serv. Comm. v. Grimsbaw, 49 Wyo. i58, 53 P. (2d) 1 (1935) ;
see Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 171 (928).
Cf. Deppman v. Murray, 5 F. Supp.
661, 669 (W. D. Wash. i934). See also Legis. (1936) 22 VA. L. REV. 695, 699.
75. Broker is defined as any person or corporation not included in the term "motor car-

rier" who sells transportation or procures facilities therefor. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. I,
§ 2 (2). Brokers are not regulated by the Texas statute.
76. 49 STAT. 546 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 304 (4) (Supp. 1937).

77. There is no similar provision in the federal statute.
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cause of arbitrary action,78 it lies within the power of the commission to forestall any such attacks by carefully avoiding an arbitrary course of action.
Squarely upon the administrative wisdom of the commission rests the effectiveness of this section.
Meeting, on the surface at least, the constitutional objection found in those
statutes which required contract carriers to take out certificates of public convenience and necessity,79 the Act provides for a "permit" as a condition
precedent to the operation of a contract carrier.80 This is practically identical
with the corresponding section in the federal act, 8' and likewise finds its counterpart in the Texas statute.8 2 There is included a "grandfather clause" whereby
a carrier operating on or before a specified date is entitled to a permit as of
right upon application. This view that existing operators have such a vested
right as will support the exemption is generally conceded and has been upheld
by the courts.8s To any carrier who cannot bring himself within the "grandfather clause", a permit is to be issued only upon a showing that he is "fit, willing, and able" to serve, and that the "proposed service . . . will be consistent
with the public interest and the policy declared in . . . this act." 84 Following

identically the provisions of the federal act,85 and quite similar to those of the
Texas statute,8 6 this section would appear to be valid as a reasonable regulatory
requirement.
In the following three sections the Act prohibits a contract carrier from
simultaneously operating as a common carrier, except by leave of the commission; 17 provides for the licensing of brokers; 88 and for a limited transfer of
permits.8 9
By section 8o8 contract carriers in the issuance or assumption of securities and the transfer of property are made subject to certain other provisions
of the Act.90 Inasmuch as these other sections refer to "public utilities" there
is at least some doubt as to their validity when applied to contract carriers.
However, the mere fact that the latter are subjected to identical regulations with
public utilities in this respect does not of itself invalidate the provision. If it
can be demonstrated that such similar regulation is reasonable and not arbitrary, the constitutional objection will be overcome. 9
Section 8o9 imposes the duty upon every contract carrier to reduce to writing and file with the commission all contracts, or copies thereof, and to file rate
schedules as the commission may require. Furthermore, no carrier may operate unless it shall have filed either its contracts or a minimum rate schedule with
the commission. These provisions may present a practical obstruction to the
78. Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 5o

Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. i65

(1932)

;

(1926);

Utah Power & Light

First Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Tax Comm., 289 U. S. 6o

(1933).

79. See supra notes ig and 22.
8o. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 804 (a).
81. 49 STAT. 552 (935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 309 (a) (Supp. 1937).
82. TEx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1934) art. 9iib, § 6 (a).
83. Stanley v. Public Util. Comm., 295 U. S. 76 (1935) ; Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Public Util. Comm., iii Ohio 68I, 146 N. E. 84 (1924). But see Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck,
297 U. S. 266, 274 (1936).
84. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 8o4 (b).
85. 49 STAT. 552 (935),

49 U. S. C. A. § 309 (b) (Supp. 1937).

86. Tax. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1934) art. giib, § 6 (c).
87. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 805.
88. Id. § 8o6.
89. Id. § 8o7. The Pennsylvania act contains no power of revocation of permit such as
is expressed in the federal act. 49 STAT. 555 (935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 312 (a) (Supp. i937).
go. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VI (issuance and assumption of securities) ; id. art. II,
§ 2o2 (acquisition and transfer of tangible property) ; id. art. IX, § 915 (surety bonds and insurance).
Supra note 38.
9i. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 (932).
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successful operation of the Act. In defining a contract carrier, the Pennsylvania Act makes no mention of operation under contracts or agreements, whereas
the federal act includes in the definition the words "under special and individual contracts or agreements". Pursuant to the broad provisions of section
204(6) in the federal act authorizing general administrative requirements, the
Interstate Commerce Commission has required contract carriers so defined to
file written contracts setting out all arrangements and terms with great particularity.9 2 There are, however, certain carriers who are unable, as a practical
matter, to write contracts that meet these standards of definiteness. 98 The
question then immediately arises as to what disposition will be made of these
carriers. By the commission's own order they cannot come within the regulations prescribed for contract carriers, yet by definition they are not common
carriers. Hence, the practical result might be to let this group go unregulated. 9 4
Possibly the change in definition in the Pennsylvania Act was purposely made
to avoid a difficulty similar to that arising under the Interstate Commerce Commission's interpretation of the federal act. However, this effort would seem
to be nullified by Section 809 which requires the filing of contracts. If the
Public Utility Commission, in the light of the federal ruling, requires the same
degree of particularity in the contracts as the Interstate Commerce Commission, certain contract carriers will not be able to comply, because they will be
unable to write contracts with the required particularity. Since they cannot be
converted into common carriers, a strict contract requirement would result in
their operating without regulation. On the other hand, if the Commission is
liberal in its contract requirements,95 this possible difficulty will be obviated,
since all contract carriers will then be able to conform to the Act. It seems
that it would have been wiser draftsmanship, in view of the experience of the
administration under the federal act, to omit the contract requirement from
section 809.
97
In the following section, 8 which is substantially similar to the federal act,
the time when and the means whereby the commission shall fix the minimum
rates authorized by a prior section 98 are set forth. Whenever the commission
finds that the rate of a contract carrier contravenes the policy declared in the
Act, it may prescribe minimum rates to be charged by such carrier. In establishing these minimum rates the commission is to consider: (i) cost of service
of such carriers, (2) effect of such minimum rates on transportation, and (3)
92. Ex parte M. C. 12, C. C. H. Fed. Car. Serv. 7066 (937) ; Ex parte M. C. 9, C. C.
H. Fed. Car. Serv. 7088 (1937).
93. Some carriers operate under general agreements whereby they consent to do all the
hauling which a shipper may require over the course of a certain period. Since the requirements at the time of making the contract are indefinite, the service and the price thereof cannot be set out in advance with particularity.
94. "If the term 'contract carrier' in the act means only those private carriers for hire
who operate under contracts of the character required by the majority, does it not necessarily
follow that private carriers for hire, who operate under contracts, which are not in writing,
are not 'bilateral', do not impose specific obligations on both parties, or do not 'cover a series of
shipments during a stated period of time', are either (i) not subjected to regulation by the
act, (2) are included in the group designated as 'common carrier(s)' in section 203 (2) (4),
or (3) are included in the group designated as 'private carriers(s)' in section 2o3 (a) (17)?
They cannot be classed as common carriers, for the reason that they do not undertake to
serve the general public. If they are not subjected to regulation by the act, they may continue their operations free from any regulation whatever by us, as there is no prohibition in
the act or elsewhere against their continuing to operate." Commissioner Lee dissenting in
Ex parte M. C. 12, C. C. H. Fed. Car. Serv. ff 7o66 (1937).
95. A memorandum setting out the general terms of the agreement should be enough to
serve the regulatory purposes, inasmuch as a schedule of rates may also be required.
96. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 8io.
97. 49 STAT. 561 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. §318 (Supp. 1937).
98. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 8o2 (a).
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diversion of the business of any common carrier by motor vehicle to other forms
of transportation. The minimum rate provision of the Texas statute which was
the rates
upheld by the Supreme Court in the Stephenson case provides that
of contract carriers shall not be less than those of common carriers. 99 Inasmuch
as a consideration of the diversion of common carrier traffic to other forms of
transportation will, as a practical matter, approximate the Texas requirement,
the Stephenson case, validating minimum rates, must be regarded as controlling 0 0
The commission is further authorized to prescribe forms for accounts,' 10
to require contract carriers to designate an agent for service of notice and process,10 2 and to issue temporary permits and licenses without hearing, 03 this section expressly stating that no application may be denied without hearing. In a
penalties for violation of any of the provisions of the
subsequent article the
04
article are set forth.1
Supersedure
Finally, the question may arise as to the effect of the federal act on the
Pennsylvania Act. The generally accepted dogma in those cases where state
and federal regulations cover approximately the same field is that the federal
legislation supersedes the state act. 10 5 However, in view of the definition of the
type of carrier that is being regulated by the Pennsylvania Act, it is only the
exceptional case that will give rise to the supersedure problem. Admittedly
there can be an interstate carrier that for some portion of its operation may
become wholly intrastate in character. 0 6 In this situation the question would
not be present because for that portion of its journey wholly intrastate the carrier would be outside the jurisdiction of the Motor Carrier Act. 07 On the
other hand, the clearly interstate carrier would not be subject to the Pennsylvania Act since it does not transport between points within the state. This
leaves, then, only the situation where a contract carrier operating wholly within
the boundaries of one state is, nevertheless, classed as engaged in interstate
commerce.' 08 The wording of the Pennsylvania Act would cover the carrier
in question, yet he would be engaged in interstate commerce and so within the
purview of the Motor Carrier Act. No such case has arisen, but it is believed
that in this extreme situation the traditional doctrine would be invoked to the
advantage of the federal legislation.
99. TEx. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1934) art. 911 b, § 6 (aa).
IOO. ". . . this [fixing minimum rates] interferes with the freedom of the parties to

contract, but it is not such an interference as the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. While
freedom of contract is the general rule, it is nevertheless not absolute. . . . When the exercise of that freedom conflicts with the power and duty of the state to safeguard its property
from injury and preserve it for those uses for which it was primarily designed, such freedom
may be regulated and limited to the extent which reasonably may be necessary to carry the
power and duty into effect." Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 274 (1932).
ioi. Pa. Laws 1937, no. 286, art. VIII, § 811.
1O2. Id. § 812.
103. Id. § 813.

io4. Id. art. XIII, § 1311.
IO5. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370 (1912) ; Oregon-Washington R. R.
& Nav. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S. 87 (1926).
io6. New York Cent. R. R. v. Mohney, 252 U. S. 152 (192o); Baltimore & 0. S. W.
R. R. v. Settle, 26o U. S. 166, 170 (1922). See also GAViT, TH ComidmcE CLAUSE (1932)
§ 64; WILLIs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 292.
107. 49 STAT. 543 (I935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3o2 (c) (Supp. 1937).
io8. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921); Real Silk Hosiery
Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (1925). See also GAvrT, op. cit. supra note io6, § 6o;
Wn.Lis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 29o. It is not within the scope of this discussion to examine
in detail the question of when one may be operating in interstate or intrastate commerce.

